We introduce a class of differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave utility functions exhibiting an explicit demand of a good which may have Giffen behavior. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition (bases on prices and consumers' preferences and income) under which this good is normal, inferior or Giffen good. Interestingly, with this utility, the equilibrium price of a good may increase in the aggregate supply for this good.
Introduction
Inferior and Giffen goods have been mentioned in most microeconomics textbooks (see Mas-Colell et al. (1995) , Jehle and Reny (2011), Varian (2014) for instance).
1 However, they are usually illustrated by pictures. In this paper, we present a class of differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave utility functions exhibiting an explicit demand of a good which may have Giffen behavior. In our example, the consumption set is R 2 + , and the demand function generated by our simple utility function has a closed-form. Thanks to this tractability, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition (based on prices and consumers' preferences and income) under which this good is normal, inferior or Giffen good. This helps us to analytically study income and prices effects. In particular, we show that the Giffen behavior arises when the price is not so high and the consumer's income is at the middle level. This is supported by empirical evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008) : when the price of a staple good increases, the poor people responds by decreasing their demand of this good while the group in the middle increases demand.
The second part of our paper focuses on the general equilibrium effects. Our utility function leads to an interesting point in general equilibrium context: the price of a good may be an increasing function of the aggregate supply of this good. Moreover, we show that the Giffen behavior may arise in equilibrium when preferences or/and endowments of agents change.
In the existing literature, several examples with Giffen behavior have been proposed. However, in most of the cases, utility functions are piecewise-defined or demand functions are not explicit or the consumption set is restricted. Heijman and von Mouche (2012) provide a collection of papers studying Giffen goods, including the paper of Doi, Iwasa, and Shimomura (2009) .
Here, we just mention two recent papers (Haagsma, 2012; Biederman, 2015) . Haagsma (2012) presents a separable utility function generating Giffen behavior.
2 In this example, the consumption set is restricted (precisely, it is (γ 1 , ∞) × [0, γ 2 ) with γ 1 > 0, γ 2 > 0) and the utility function is quasi-concave but not concave. Moreover, in Haagsma (2012) , the good 1 demand c 1 is always decreasing in the income, denoted by w, whatever the prices and the consumer's income. However, in our model, the sign of ∂c 1 ∂w depends on the prices and the consumer's income. Recently, Biederman (2015) provides a concave utility function 3 and gives some numerical examples where Giffen behavior arises. However, the demand function is not explicit. In our paper, we can explicitly derive the demand function.
Individual demand
Assume that there are two goods and the consumption set is R 2 + . Given prices p 1 > 0, p 2 > 0 and income w > 0, the consumer maximizes her utility U (c 1 , c 2 ) subject to the budget constraint p 1 c 1 + p 2 c 2 ≤ w. We will study how the demand c 1 changes when the consumer's income w or/and price p 1 change.
Assume that the solution is unique and interior, then it is determined by p 1 c 1 + p 2 c 2 = w and the first order condition
where
(c 1 , c 2 ) for i = 1, 2. From this, we obtain the following result.
2 The utility function is u(c 1 , c 2 ) = α 1 ln(c 1 − γ 1 ) − α 2 ln(γ 2 − c 2 ) where 0 < α 1 < α 2 and γ 1 , γ 2 > 0, with the domain c 1 > γ 1 and 0 ≤ c 2 < γ 2 .
3 Biederman (2015) considers the following utility function
Lemma 1. Assume that U is strictly concave, strictly increasing and in C 2 . Assume that (c 1 , c 2 ) is an interior solution. Then, we have that:
Consequently,
< 0 (if good 1 is Giffen, then it must be inferior).
Proof. See Appendix A.1
We now introduce a class of utility function generating demand with Giffen behavior. Suggesting by (2b), we choose a function such that U 21 /U 22 is constant. Proposition 1. We assume that
where a, b, λ, A > 0, λ = 1, and ab = 1. 4 This function is strictly increasing, strictly concave and differentiable. The demand function for good 1 is given by
Moreover, the demand function is continuous.
5
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We now provide intuitions explaining the form (4) of the demand function. It is easy to see that
So, according to (5a), the consumer does not buy good 1 if the relative price of good 1 is high (in the sense that p 1 /p 2 ≥ max(a, 1/b)).
4 Indeed, when ab = 1, maximizing this utility function is equivalent to maximizing the utility function c 1 + bc 2 , which does not correspond to our perspective.
5 Moreover, the demand function is differentiable in (w, p 1 , p 2 , a, b, λ) except points satisfying
According to condition (5b), the consumer does not buy good 2 if the relative price of good 2 is high (in the sense that p 2 min(a, 1/b) ≥ p 1 ). Under the second condition in (4), the solution is interior. Notice that, this condition implies that (ap 2 − p 1 )(bp 1 − p 2 ) > 0, and so, the relative price has a middle level: min(a, 1/b) ≤ p 1 /p 2 ≤ max(a, 1/b). The second condition in (4) also requires that the income w of the consumer must be bounded from below and above.
Proposition 1 allows us to identify conditions under which good 1 is normal, inferior or Giffen.
Proposition 2. Let assumptions in Proposition 1 be satisfied. Consider the case of interior solution.
1. Good 1 is normal (i.e., ∂c 1 /∂w > 0) if and only if ap 2 < p 1 .
2. Good 1 is inferior (i.e., ∂c 1 /∂w < 0) if and only if ap 2 > p 1 .
3. Good 1 has Giffen behavior (i.e., ∂c 1 /∂p 1 > 0) if and only if
Moreover, there exists a positive list (p 1 , p 2 , a, b, λ, A, w) such that (6b) and (6a) hold.
Proof. See Appendix A.3.
By combining Propositions 1 and 2, good 1 is normal if (1) the consumer only buys this good (c 1 = w/p 1 ) or (2) the solution is interior (condition (6a) holds) and the relative price is quite high (i.e., ap 2 < p 1 ). When the solution is interior, good 1 is inferior if and only if the relative price p 1 /p 2 is low
We now look at conditions under which Giffen behavior arises. Condition (6a) is to ensure that the optimal allocation is interior while condition (6b) means that ∂c 1 /∂p 1 > 0. Given a, b, p 1 , p 2 , A, w such that bp 1 > p 2 > w > p 1 /a, conditions (6a) and (6b) are satisfied if λ is high enough; in addition, once (6a) is satisfied, condition 6b) tends to hold if w is low and/or A is high. For example, when p 1 = 2, p 2 = 2, w = 1.1, a = 2, b = 3, A = 3, λ = 6.
Proposition 2 allows us to understand the role of income in the existence of Giffen behavior. Indeed, let us assume that bp 1 > p 2 > p 1 /a. According to (4), the consumer only buys the good 1 if her income is very low; in this case, the good 1 consumption is increasing in the income and the good 1 can be viewed as the most basic good that the consumer can buy. Once the income exceeds a threshold w determined by A(ap 2 − p 1 ) = (bp 1 − p 2 ) aw p 1 λ but still lower the upper boundw determined by
λ , she buys both goods (interior solution). In this case, the good 1 consumption is firstly decreasing in the income w if w ∈ (w, w * ), where w * such that the left hand side of (6b) is zero. By consequence, the Giffen behavior arises when the income is at the middle level. This property is supported by the empirical evidences in Jensen and Miller (2008) . We end this section by providing some useful observations when finding utility functions generating inferior goods as well as Giffen behavior.
1. Assume that the utility function is separable, i.e., U (c 1 , c 2 ) = u(c 1 ) + v(c 2 ). If u and u are concave, then c 1 is increasing in income w. Indeed, we have U 12 = 0. So, Lemma 1 implies that: + 1 < 0. This cannot happen because both u and v are concave.
However, If u or v is not concave, we can obtain inferior good and Giffen behavior. Indeed, assume that the consumption set is R . In this case, one can prove that the demand for good 1 is
So, the good 1 is normal if w 2 ≤ 4Ap 2 2 . When w 2 > 4Ap 2 2 , the good 1 is inferior but not Giffen.
Haagsma (2012) considers a separable function u(c 1 , c 2 ) = α 1 ln(c 1 −γ 1 )−α 2 ln(γ 2 − c 2 ) where the second term is convex in c 2 . In this case, he shows that Giffen behavior may arise. Note that the consumption set is (γ 1 , ∞) × [0, γ 2 ) which is restricted.
2. We can also obtain Giffen behavior with simple utility functions by restricting the consumption set in another way. Indeed, assume that U (c 1 , c 2 ) = c 1 + bc 2 with b > 0 and the consumption set is {(c 1 , c 2 ) ∈ R 2 + : c 1 + c 2 ≥ 1}. c 1 + c 2 ≥ 1 is interpreted as survival condition. We can verify that: if p 1 < p 2 < bp 1 and w < p 2 , then c 1 = p 2 −w p 2 −p 1 which is increasing in price p 1 and decreasing in income w.
3. In the case of Leontief utility U (c 1 , c 2 ) = min(u(c 1 ), v(c 2 )) where u, v are increasing, c 1 is increasing in w. However, Sorensen (2007) considers the function U (c 1 , c 2 ) = min(u(c 1 , c 2 ), v(c 1 , c 2 )) and show that this function may generate Giffen behavior.
Equilibrium
We now look at equilibrium properties. We consider a pure exchange economy with two goods. Assume that there are m agents with the same utility function
, where a > 0, b > 0, λ > 0, λ = 1. The consumption set is R 2 + and the endowments of agent i are w i 1 > 0, w i 2 > 0 for goods 1, 2, respectively. We firstly investigate the equilibrium prices. The income of agent i is w i ≡ p 1 w i 1 + p 2 w i 2 . We focus on interior equilibrium: c j 1 ∈ (0, w i /p 1 ) ∀i. According to Proposition 1, we have that 
1. If ab > 1, then p 1 /p 2 ∈ (1/b, a) and is decreasing in w 1 , w 2 but increasing in A.
2. If ab < 1, then p 1 /p 2 ∈ (a, 1/b) and is increasing in w 1 , w 2 but decreasing in A.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
According to Proposition, our utility function (3) generates an interesting property: the price of good 1 (resp., good 2) is increasing in its aggregate supply W 1 ≡ i w i 1 (resp., W 2 ≡ i w i 2 ) if ab < 1 (resp., ab > 1). We now look at the demand for good 1 of agent i to understand when Giffen behavior arises. According to (8) and (9), we can compute
By consequence, we have the following result.
Corollary 1. We have
This result leads to an interesting implication: the Giffen behavior arises when preferences of agents change. Indeed, without the loss of generality, assume that ab > 1. We also assume that agent i's endowments are low in the sense that aw 1 +w 2 > aw i 1 +w i 2 . In this case, when A increases or b decreases, the relative pricep 1 increases. By consequence, the demand for good 1 of this agent increases in the relative price p 1 /p 2 .
Notice that the Giffen behavior can also arise when agents' endowments change. Indeed, let us consider a simple case where there are identical agents and ab < 1. In this case, c i 1 = w 1 ∀i and the relative price p 1 /p 2 is increasing in w 1 . So, the good 1 consumption c i 1 = w 1 is increasing in p 1 /p 2 . In this case, the good 2 consumption is decreasing in p 2 /p 1 . 6 We require (w i 1 , w i 2 ) to be closed to (w 1 , w 2 ) to ensure that with the equilibrium price given by (9), the optimal allocation is interior, i.e., c j 1 ∈ (0, w i /p 1 ) ∀i.
A Appendix

A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
The FOC can be rewritten as
By taking the derivatives of both sides of this equation with respect to w, we get that
which implies that
Since U is strictly concave, we have p 2 2 U 11 (c 1 ,
By taking the derivatives of both sides of (A.1) with respect to p 1 , we get
Consequently, we obtain
which implies (2b).
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
The budget constraint must be binding: p 1 c 1 + p 2 c 2 = w. Since the feasible set is convex, concave and the function U is strictly concave and strictly increasing, there exists a unique solution. We write FOCs We have U 1 (c 1 , c 2 ) = 1 + aA(ac 1 + c 2 ) −λ and U 2 (c 1 , c 2 ) = b + A(ac 1 + c 2 ) −λ . We consider different cases.
1. c 1 = 0, c 2 = w/p 2 . In this case, λ 2 = 0 and then
. This means that is optimal for the agent i. To do so, it suffices to check the following condition (we apply Proposition 1),
(A.14)
